Examine Gilbert Ryle’s Objection Against Cartesian Mind Body Dualism
Gilbert Ryle, a 20th-century British philosopher, famously critiqued Cartesian dualism in his book The Concept of Mind. René Descartes proposed that the mind and body are two separate substances: the mind is non-physical, while the body is physical. Ryle rejected this dualism as a category mistake.
According to Ryle, Descartes committed a logical error by treating the mind as a thing comparable to the body. He called this the “ghost in the machine” view—suggesting that there is a non-physical mind controlling the body, like a ghost operating a machine. Ryle argued that mental states are not separate substances but are dispositions or ways of behaving.
By reducing mental processes to observable behavior and tendencies, Ryle proposed a behaviorist approach to the mind. His critique shifted philosophical focus from metaphysical speculation to functional analysis of mental concepts, making his objection a turning point in the philosophy of mind.